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NOTE
INVASIONS OF PRIVACY AND COMPUTER MATCHING
PROGRAMS: A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Federal Government initiated computer matching programs in the early 1970's, 1 and their use has since dramatically
increased. 2 Computer matching "involves the comparison of two or
more sets or systems of computerized records to search for individuals
who may be included in more than one file. ' 3 Typically, federal agencies use computer matching to detect fraud, error or abuse in government programs, or to determine whether a specific applicant or
recipient of benefits under a government program truly qualifies for
those benefits. 4 By reducing such wastes, computer matching helps to
ensure the integrity and efficiency of government programs. 5 The Office of Management and Budget, and the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, have attributed "substantial savings and recoveries
of overpayment in federal benefit programs" to computer matching.6
Privacy advocates feel that the substantial savings in federal benefit
programs do not occur without a significant cost. Congress has expressed concern that "the increasing use of computers and sophisticated
information technology, while essential to the efficient operations of
government, has greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that
can occur from any collection, maintenance, use or dissemination of personal information."'7 Congress passed the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 19888 ("Computer Matching Act") to protect the
privacy rights of individuals whose records are compared in computer
1. Jaffess v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 393 F. Supp. 626 (1975); S.
REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
2. S. REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988).
3. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federal Government Information Technology: Electronic Record Systems and Individual Privacy, OTA-CIT-296, 37
(June 1986).
4. S. REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 6 (citing the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896
(1974)).
8. Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
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matching programs. 9 One requirement of the Computer Matching Act
is the submission of a cost-benefit analysis demonstrating that the benefits of a computer match will outweigh the privacy costs.10
This Note proposes that, contrary to popular opinion, computer
matching does not necessarily invade a person's privacy. Computer
matching that does invade one's privacy may be the exception rather
than the rule and therefore a cost-benefit analysis is not needed.
The Note is divided into three sections. The first section analyzes
the distinction between a loss of privacy and an invasion of privacy. Not
every loss of privacy constitutes an invasion. This Note proposes that
an invasion of privacy occurs when (1) there is a loss of privacy and
(2) no consent is given for that loss. The second section of this Note
analyzes two computer matching programs that would be subject to the
provisions of the Computer Matching Act to show that they do not create an invasion of privacy. Such an analysis requires one to define
clearly the notion of consent, a concept central to any invasion of privacy claim. The final section looks to the functions privacy serves to defend the use of Thomas Huff's definition of consent as the basis for
determining whether computer matching programs create an invasion
11
of privacy.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN A LOSS AND AN INVASION
OF PRIVACY
In order to determine whether computer matching programs create
an invasion of privacy, one must first define the terms: privacy, loss and
invasion. The definition of privacy is taken from the work of Ruth
Gavison.12 In her article, Privacy and the Limits of Law, she suggests
that privacy is a limitation of others' access to an individual. 13 "A loss
of privacy occurs as others obtain information about an individual, pay
4
attention to him, or gain physical access to him.'
An invasion of privacy, however, is an "unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another.'1 5 There are three elements which must
be established for the tort of an invasion of privacy. These elements
are: (1) an intrusion by the defendant; (2) into a matter which the
9. 1& at 1.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(B) (1988).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45. Huff states that our privacy is not invaded by a disclosure of information when we choose to place ourselves in a position
where evaluations are expected.

12. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980).
13. Id,
14. Id (emphasis added).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 652A(2)(6) (1976); 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy

§ 38 (1990).
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plaintiff has a right to keep private; and (3) by the use of a method
16
which is objectionable to the reasonable person.
The single factor which distinguishes a loss of privacy from an invasion of privacy is "consent." A person can consent to allow another to
obtain information about himself or herself, to pay attention to him or
her, or to gain physical access to him or her (i.e. a person can consent to
a loss of privacy). 17 In contrast, one cannot consent to an invasion of
privacy. Although commentators have treated consent as a bar to a
claim for damages upon a finding of a privacy invasion,' 8 this author
disputes that one can waive an invasion of privacy by consent. Consent
is not a defense to an invasion. Consent means that no invasion of privacy can occur. By examining the three elements which establish an invasion of privacy, one can see how consent vitiates each element.
The first element requires an intrusion by the defendant. According to Webster's dictionary, to intrude is "to come or go in without...
permission."'1 9 If one enters with permission, then one cannot intrude.
Similarly, just as one cannot consent to an intrusion, one cannot consent to an invasion.
The second element requires that the plaintiff has a right to keep
the information private. This right cannot be considered inalienable. If
X cannot provide Y with information about X (i.e. "sell" his privacy),
because X's privacy right is inalienable, X and Y would not be able to
engage in any sort of contractual relation. This infringes upon X's liberty of action, a value that privacy is supposed to promote.20 When X
consents to provide information about himself to Y, he bargains away
his right to keep that information private. Consent, in effect, extinguishes such a right with respect to Y.
The third element requires that the invader use a method which is
objectionable to a reasonable person. In Nader v. General Motors
Corp.,21 the Court of Appeals of New York stated that the defendant's
conduct must be "designed to elicit information which would not be
available through normal inquiry or observation. '22 The court adopted
a result-oriented approach, rather than a process-oriented approach, to
determine the existence of this third element. That is to say, the emphasis is not on how the method was employed but on the information
16. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 48 (1990).

17. See infra text accompanying notes 24-27 as an example of consent to a loss of
privacy.
18.

62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 59 (1990).

19. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1187 (1986) (emphasis added).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44.

21. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
22. Id. at 567, 255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (emphasis added).
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it was designed to obtain. If the method is designed to elicit information
which the plaintiff meant to keep private, then one could say that such
a method is objectionable because it is designed to elicit information
which would not be available through normal inquiry. A normal inquiry would not be designed to elicit information that a reasonable person would refuse to reveal. Consent, therefore, creates the parameters
of a normal inquiry. Normal inquiries elicit information which the
plaintiff has consented to release. Unreasonable inquiries elicit information which does not have this consent. Consent determines whether
the method of inquiry is objectionable or not.
This analysis suggests that an invasion of privacy has two requirements: (1) there must be a loss of privacy and (2) this loss must occur
without the consent of the individual. The next step is to apply this definition to determine whether computer matching programs create an invasion of privacy.
III.

DO COMPUTER MATCHING PROGRAMS CREATE AN
INVASION OF PRIVACY?

The Computer Matching Act covers two kinds of computer matching programs: (1) a comparison of records for the purpose of establishing or verifying eligibility for a federal benefit program, and (2) a
comparison for the purpose of recouping payments or delinquent debts
under benefit programs. 23 This Part determines whether the following
two computer matching programs that fall within the purview of the
Computer Matching Act create an invasion of privacy.
A.

JAFFESS V. SECRETARY, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE

Ira Jaffess was receiving a disability benefits pension from the Veterans Administration ("VA") as well as Social Security benefits. The
amount of VA benefits payable varies depending upon the veteran's annual income from other sources, including income received under the
Social Security Act.24 "A veteran who receives [VA] benefits is obligated by law to report changes in his annual income to the VA."'25 Mr.
Jaffess did not report his Social Security benefits to the VA.
The VA subsequently conducted a computer match of persons who
received VA benefits with those receiving Social Security benefits, information provided by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
("HEW"). This comparison was "performed 'in order to locate persons
who have failed to report their Social Security benefits to the VA as re23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i) (1988).
24. 38 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
25. Jaffess v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 393 F. Supp. 626, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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quired by law.' "26 Through this comparison, the VA discovered a discrepancy between the information Mr. Jaffess had provided the VA and
the information the HEW had. Mr. Jaffess was a "hit." On January 6,
1975, Mr. Jaffess received notice from the VA that his benefits would be
reduced. Did the computer matching create a loss of privacy to which
Mr. Jaffess did not consent?
1.

ObtainingInformation About an Individual

In answering this question, one must first determine whether some
entity obtained information about Mr. Jaffess. On the face of things,
the VA apparently obtained information about Mr. Jaffess regarding his
Social Security benefits. However, in order to receive VA benefits, Mr.
Jaffess was required to disclose information regarding his income. Mr.
Jaffess voluntarily agreed to such an arrangement. Mr. Jaffess, then,
voluntarily assumed a role or "image," and presented it to the VA. Any
information conveyed by assuming this role may be considered a loss of
privacy, but Mr. Jaffess consented to this loss by consenting to assume
the role. 27
The issue is whether the HEW invaded Mr. Jaffess's privacy by allowing the VA access to the Social Security records to conduct the computer match. Such an invasion of privacy did not occur. The role or
image which Mr. Jaffess assumed called for him to disclose his income
accurately to the VA. The VA's knowledge was that Mr. Jaffess had the
acceptable level of income to receive VA benefits. The computer match
did not provide the VA with any further information about Mr. Jaffess.
It simply attempted to verify the accuracy of the information that Mr.
Jaffess had already provided.
One response to this argument is that the VA now knows that Mr.
Jaffess falsely reported his income to the VA. This is additional information about Mr. Jaffess that was not part of the agreement with the
VA. Such information is beyond the scope of the consent given.
The premise of this argument is incorrect. When Mr. Jaffess reported his income to the VA, the VA believed that Mr. Jaffess would report his income accurately and would continue to do so in the future.
Therefore, the VA received information regarding Mr. Jaffess's trustworthiness, which constituted a part of the image Mr. Jaffess had assumed. The computer match not only attempted to verify the accuracy
of Mr. Jaffess's income, but also attempted to verify the information
which the VA already had on Mr. Jaffess's trustworthiness.
Professor Gavison presents a point that may still refute the idea
26. Id
27. The idea of presenting an "image" shall be discussed in more detail in the last
section regarding the notion of consent.
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that the VA received no new information from the computer match.
Her argument calls for a distinction between verbal and sensory knowledge. 28 The example she provides is as follows:
[A]ssume Y learns that X is bald because he reads a verbal description
of X. At a later time, Y sees X and, naturally, observes that X is bald.
Has Y acquired any further information about X, and if so, what is it?
It might be argued that even a rereading of a verbal description may
about X, even though Y has no addireveal to Y further information
29
tional source of information.
Assuming that such a rereading does produce additional information, this result would not occur with computer matching programs. If
Mr. Jaffess had provided the VA with correct information, he would not
be a hit when the computer match is conducted. Since there is no discrepancy between the information he provided the VA and the Social
Security records, he would not be registered by the computer. The person conducting the computer match reads only the hits. Since Mr. Jaffess would not be a hit, he would not be reread, and so Professor
Gavison's point would not apply. A computer rereads the information,
not an individual.
Mr. Jaffess was, however, a hit. The VA read both his description
of his Social Security benefits and the HEW's description of his Social
Security benefits. If both descriptions had been the same, then one
could argue that such a rereading produced additional information
about Mr. Jaffess. But the only reason this rereading occurred is because of the discrepancy between the two sets of information. Before
the computer match, the VA's information about Mr. Jaffess is that Mr.
Jaffess's report of his income is true and that Mr. Jaffess is trustworthy.
After the match, the VA does not know which record of Mr. Jaffess's
income is correct or whether Mr. Jaffess falsely reported his income.
This uncertainty reflects a loss of information. For example, if I read a
description of Mr. Jaffess that states he is bald, I now have information
about Mr. Jaffess. When I read a second description about Mr. Jaffess
that states he is not bald, I now know that Mr. Jaffess is either bald or
not bald. Therefore, I know nothing about the state of Mr. Jaffess's
scalp, while before I read the second description, I did have such information. I have lost information about Mr. Jaffess. Computer matching
programs thus seem to either (1) not affect the obtaining of information at all, as is the case when Mr. Jaffess is not a hit, or (2) question
the validity of information the VA already has received, when Mr. Jaffess is a hit.
28. Gavison, supra note 12, at 430.
29. I&
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Paying Attention to the Individual

While computer matching may not further the level of information
the VA has on Mr. Jaffess, some may feel that the computer match may
be an invasion of privacy by bringing Mr. Jaffess to the attention of the
VA, where, before, he had not been the subject of attention. 3° Professor
Gavison states that
X may be the subject of Y's attention in two ways. First, Y may follow
X, stare at him, listen to him, or observe him in any other way. Alternatively, Y may concentrate his thoughts on X. Only the first way...
is directly related to a loss of privacy. Discussing, imagining, or thinking about another person is related to privacy in a more indirect way, if
31

at all.

The VA did not pay attention to Mr. Jaffess in the first sense. The
VA observed information about Mr. Jaffess. They did not observe Mr.
Jaffess, the individual. They have not followed him, stared at him, or
listened to him, as the first sense states. Furthermore, the VA probably
did not pay attention to Mr. Jaffess in the second sense either. Since, in
all likelihood, there were many such hits, just like Mr. Jaffess, 32 and
the VA did not conduct any further hearings or investigations, one must
question whether the VA discussed, imagined, or even thought about
Mr. Jaffess at all. Mr. Jaffess was simply one hit among many. The VA
terminated his benefits because they now had less information about
Mr. Jaffess than he had agreed to provide.
One may feel that the VA violated Mr. Jaffess's due process rights
by lowering his benefits without a formal inquiry, but this has nothing
to do with a loss of privacy. In fact, if the VA had conducted a formal
hearing, they would have been more likely to have invaded his privacy.
A formal hearing would focus more attention on Mr. Jaffess than simply terminating his benefits did. Any attention a person receives after a
computer match comes not from the results of the match, but by any
further verification or formal inquiry procedures regarding the results.
Post-match verification is not a way of protecting against an invasion of
privacy from a computer match. This verification may create an invasion of privacy that would not exist otherwise. One must weigh the
value of due process against the value of privacy to determine the appropriate extent of such verification procedures.
30. Id.at 432.
31. 1I
32. The computer comparison was of all persons who received VA and Social Security
benefits. Jaffess v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 393 F. Supp. 626, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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3. Gaining Physical Access to the Individual
As Gavison has noted, "[individuals lose privacy when others gain
physical access to them. Physical access here means physical proximity-that Y is close enough to touch or observe X through normal use of
his senses. '33 The essence of the complaint is not that more information about a person has been acquired or that more attention has been
drawn to him, but that his spatial aloneness has been diminished.
The computer matching program did not violate Mr. Jaffess's spatial aloneness because it did not allow physical access to him. Opponents may, however, argue that the reduction of benefits was a physical
access to Mr. Jaffess and that the physical access was a direct result of
the computer matching program.
Such a concept of physical access is quite troublesome. This notion
of physical access embodies the idea that if X confers a benefit on Y,
under certain conditions, and Y does not meet those conditions, X cannot reclaim the benefits conferred because they have become part of
Y's spatial aloneness. For example, if a bank were to loan money to Y
to finance a house, and Y defaults, the bank should be allowed to repossess the house. This repossession is not a gain of physical access because
there is no violation of physical proximity. If the bank, instead, let Y
keep the house but forced Y to live with the bank president's motherin-law, then there would be a diminishing of spatial aloneness.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the computer match in Joffess
did not invade Mr. Jaffess's privacy. The next computer match to be
analyzed will solidify this point.
B.

COMPUTER MATCH BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

In 1982, the Department of Education ("DE") compared by computer a list of delinquent student loan debtors against a list of federal
employee active and retired rolls. 34 This computer match recovered
$3.4 million in delinquent loan payments. 35 According to the Debt Collection Act of 1982,
[w]hen the head of an agency ... determines that an employee ... is
indebted to the United States for debts to which the United States is
entitled to be repaid at the time of the determination by the head of an
agency .... or is notified of such a debt by the head of another agency
....

the amount of the indebtedness may be collected in monthly in-

stallments, or at officially established pay intervals, by deduction from
33. Gavison, supra note 12, at 433.
34. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Gov. Management of the Committee on GovernmentalAffairs, S. REP. No. 2756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1986).
35. S. REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
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the current pay account of the individual. 36
Does this computer match create an invasion of privacy?
1.

ObtainingInformation About an Individual

To analyze whether any additional information has come out of the
computer match, consider the hypothetical federal employee X who has
received student loans and is now delinquent in repaying them.
The issue is what information did X supply to the DE in order to
receive the loans. X does not have to inform the DE as to whether or
not he is a federal employee as a condition of receiving the loan. This is
not part of the price of the loan. Therefore, when the DE does a computer match with the list of federal employees, they will gain information about X's status as a federal employee without X's consent.
One argument against this conception of the agreement between
the DE and X is that part of the price for receiving a student loan requires X to pay back the loan. Since X is now being forced to pay it
back, the DE should have access to the information that X is a federal
employee as agreed upon for the DE to collect X's debt through wages.
This analysis, however, ignores the fact that if X had paid the loan back,
the DE would not know he was a federal employee. After the computer
match, the DE knows that X is a federal employee. Thus, the only instance threatening an invasion of privacy occurs when X has breached
his contract with the DE. If X had paid his loan, he would not have
been involved in the match. The DE would not have received information about him and would not have invaded X's privacy.
Such a rationale for recognizing an invasion of privacy when X
breaches the contract is worrisome because it rejects the basic notion
that expectation damages should be awarded for a breach of contract.
When X fails to repay the loan and breaches the contract, the DE is entitled to its expectation damages which is equivalent to the loan money.
The DE, however, gets more than the loan money. It receives knowledge that X is a federal employee. This additional information punishes
X just as if a court had awarded punitive damages for breach of a
contract.
An additional unfairness to X arises when the DE's information is
incorrect. Suppose X has paid his debt, but the DE records him as being
delinquent. After the match, the DE receives information that X is a
federal employee even though X has not breached his obligation to repay the debt. This scenario differs from Jaffess. In Jaffess, the VA had
information before the match that was A. 37 After the computer match,
36. Debt Collection Act of 1982, § 5(a), Pub. L. No. 97-365, 96 Stat. 1749, 1751 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1) (1988)).
37. A = Mr. Jaffess's income is at the acceptable level.
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the VA arrived at a point where the information was either A or not-A.
In the DE hypothetical case, the DE has information before the match
that is either B or not-B.as After the match, the DE has information
that is B. By comparison, the VA obtains less information about Mr.
Jaffess than it was entitled to have, whereas the DE has more information about X than it was entitled to have.
One objection to this analysis is that the DE has not received any
information about X that X had not already consented to provide. The
following scenario exemplifies the indirect consent of X to the DE's access to X's student loan information if X is a federal employee.
When X gets a job at some federal agency, ABC, the agency will inquire whether X has defaulted on any student loans. Assume that X
provides false information and says he is not a delinquent student loan
debtor. After X starts to receive benefits from the government (his
paycheck), ABC conducts a computer match with the DE and discovers
the discrepancy. This situation is similar to Jffess. ABC now has less
information about X than X had agreed to provide. ABC can now deduct money from X's pay in order to pay the debt. When ABC provides
this money to the DE, it is basically telling the DE that X is a federal
employee and this money pays his debt. The computer match would
not be an invasion of privacy, because if X had initially told the truth
that he was a student loan defaulter, X would know that ABC would deduct money from his pay and give it to the DE which would then know
that X is a federal employee. X has, therefore, indirectly, consented to
the DE to provide information that he is a federal employee.
The weak link in this indirect consent model is in the assumption
that X would know that ABC would deduct the money and give it to the
DE. If X does not know that ABC would use the deductions from his
salary to pay the DE, then X has not given consent to this loss of privacy. Such a situation does not, however, seem likely. ABC can inform
X directly, which means X has given consent. If ABC does not, the analysis is more complicated. Since X knows to whom he has defaulted, and
that ABC will collect his debt, 3 9 X should know who receives the
money. Under either analysis, a computer match does not necessarily
result in an invasion of privacy.
2.

PayingAttention to the Individual and Gaining PhysicalAccess to
the Individual

The DE's computer matching also fails to satisfy the last elements
of Gavison's index for testing an invasion of privacy. As under Jaffess,
the level of attention necessary to trigger an invasion of privacy de38. B = X is a federal employee.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1) (1988).
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pends upon the verification and formal hearing procedures that occur
after the computer match. Also, a reduction of wages if X is a federal
employee does not violate X's spatial aloneness just as a reduction of
veteran's benefits did not increase physical access to Mr. Jaffess.
IV.

THE NOTION OF CONSENT

The key element to the foregoing analysis is the word consent. In
Joffess, Mr. Jaffess consented to provide information regarding his Social Security benefits to the VA. The computer match was merely an
attempt to verify information that had already been provided with consent.40 Similarly, in the DE's computer match, the argument is that X
indirectly consented to provide information that he is a federal em41
ployee to the DE.
One may, however, reasonably argue that neither Mr. Jaffess nor X
really consented at all. While Mr. Jaffess did agree to provide information regarding his Social Security benefits to the VA, he chose to withhold certain information. After the computer match, the VA obtains
information that can indicate either a failure to report benefits or reporting benefits when X never received them.42 Since there is no evidence that Mr. Jaffess gave explicit consent to the HEW to allow his
Social Security information to be used to verify information he gave to
the VA, one may argue that the information from the HEW is being
used for a purpose that was not originally intended. Such a situation is
exactly why one fears an invasion of privacy.
This argument also applies to the DE's computer match. The consent that was derived is an indirect consent. Since X did not explicitly
say that the DE is entitled to know whether he is a federal employee,
then the information that ABC has (that X is a federal employee) is being used for a purpose that was not originally intended (i.e. for the purpose of debt collection).
The question is how to correctly define consent. This Part suggests
that consent should be drawn in a broader sense, and not in the explicit,
narrow sense just mentioned. The definition of consent suggested is
taken from the work of Thomas Huff.4 3 Huff states that
[o]ur privacy is invaded by disclosures of information when the sort of
information which could make us subject to evaluation is transmitted
to persons who lack the authority to evaluate us....
...[Ojur privacy is... waived in those circumstances in which evalua40.
41.
42.
43.

See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
I&
Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REv. 777, 782 (1980).
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tion is appropriateor approved.... [Ojurprivacy is not invaded by the
disclosure of information because we choose to place ourselves in a position where evaluations are expected . .. [Where information is released without our permission, or is sought in contexts in which we
have not sought evaluation.... [then] our privacy is invaded. 44
The rationale for adopting Huff's idea of consent comes from looking at
the ways privacy serves the individual.

A.

CONSENT AND THE FUNCTIONS OF PRIVACY

1. Promote Liberty of Action
Professor Gavison states
privacy... severs the individual's conduct from knowledge of the conduct by others. Privacy thus... functions to promote liberty of action,
[by] removing the unpleasant consequences of certain actions and thus
45
increasing the liberty to perform them.
This promotion of liberty of action links privacy to a variety of individual goals.
These goals are as follows.
2. Promote Human Relations
Professor Gavison argues:
Privacy also functions to promote liberty in ways that enhance the capacity of individuals to create and maintain human relations of different intensities. Privacy enables individuals to establish a plurality of
roles and presentations [i.e. images] to the world. This control over
"editing" one's self is crucial, for it is through the images of others that
human relations are created and maintained. 46
This liberty to edit one's self, however, is not unfettered. "Privacy
is derived from liberty in the sense that we tend to allow privacy to the
extent that its promotion of liberty is considered desirable. ' 47 The
question to address is whether computer matching programs have a desirable effect on one's liberty to edit one's self.
In the computer matching programs discussed, both Mr. Jaffess and
X presented images of themselves that contained false information. 48
The computer matching programs verified the truthfulness of the
images presented. Both Mr. Jaffess and X now have difficulty in
44. 1I (emphasis added).
45. Gavison, supra note 12, at 448.
46. Id. at 450.
47. 1i at 451.
48. Mr. Jaffess gave the image to the VA that he had a level of social security benefits
that allowed him to receive VA benefits. X gave the image to ABC that he was not a student loan defaulter.
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presenting such images. They have lost control of their ability to present certain images. Nevertheless, this loss is a desirable effect.
As Professor Gavison stated, "control over 'editing' one's self is
crucial. ' 49 The word edit, according to Webster's dictionary, means
(1) to select, revise, etc., or (2) to assemble by cutting, rearranging,
etc. 5° Edit does not mean to present false information as if it were true.
Edit connotes selecting to show only certain true aspects of one's self,
not fabricating an image. Fabrication goes beyond the scope of editing.
One can consider the distinction as being between malfeasance and
nonfeasance. When a person withholds certain information about himself, this can be considered a nonfeasant image that is presented. When
he or she presents false information, this is a malfeasant image. To edit
one's self cannot, therefore, mean to present a malfeasant image because a malfeasant image goes beyond the definition of edit.
Even if the term edit could be construed to allow for a malfeasant
image, such a construction is not desirable. "Socrates warns at the beginning of the Crito, our concern should not be with the opinions men
have of us, but rather with the truth of those opinions."'51 The reason
for allowing one to edit one's self is to facilitate human relations. If,
however, Y cannot verify that the image X presents is true, then Y will
not be willing to bear the risk of its falsity by becoming involved in certain relations with X. To allow editing to include the idea of the malfeasant image is to harm the very reason for its existence.
Put simply, when one knowingly presents false information about
himself to another (the malfeasant image), it is appropriate for the
other to evaluate the information. This evaluation is necessary to promote human relations. The Huff-type consent has, therefore, been
given. The evaluation may cause a loss of reputation, but it does not
cause a loss of privacy to which there is no consent. Note that this consent extends only to the verification of information provided. To attempt to discover undisclosed information through a verification
procedure is a breach of the nonfeasant image and is an invasion of
privacy.
Computer matching programs serve to facilitate human relations by
making detection of the malfeasant image easier, thus giving people
more faith in the truthfulness of an image that is presented. The computer matching programs discussed in this Note go strictly to detecting
the malfeasant image. There is, however, the concern that not all computer matching programs are used strictly for verification purposes.
49. Gavison, supra note 12, at 450 (emphasis added).
50. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

723 (1986).
51. Huff, supra note 43, at 783.
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Some fear that they may be used to delve into the nonfeasant image.
For example, after receiving information from the HEW regarding the
level of Social Security benefits (pertinent to detecting a malfeasant image), the VA may receive some other information that Mr. Jaffess provided to the HEW but did not provide to the VA. This information
would breach the nonfeasant image that Mr. Jaffess presented to the
VA.
While this may be a legitimate concern, it can be resolved easily.
Federal agencies use computer matching to detect fraud, error and
abuse in government programs or to determine whether a specific applicant or recipient of benefits under a government program truly qualifies for benefits. 52 One could argue that there is little reason for them
to gather information about an individual beyond the agency's verification needs. Gathering such extraneous information on a large scale
takes up space in a computer memory and incurs costs. Even if one still
feels that there is such a concern, simple measures can be taken to prevent a breach of the nonfeasant image. First, the agency should ensure
that every computer match is drawn narrowly to serve either (1) the
purpose of establishing or verifying eligibility for a federal benefit program, or (2) the purpose of collecting payments or delinquent debts
under such programs. 53 Computer matching can be conducted narrowly,54 so there is less of a chance that there will be an intrusion into
the nonfeasant image. Such narrowing is not expensive so that costs
will not deter an agency from adhering to the restrictive searches.
Second, an agency should destroy the computer match results after
the verification is completed. 55 In this way any extraneous information
that may have been caught in the computer match will be destroyed
and cannot be passed on to other agencies in the event of future computer matches.
A related issue involves the occurrence of computer error. If person X provides correct information to the VA about his Social Security
52. S. REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
53. The Computer Matching Act can provide this measure because it requires that a
computer match can only occur if there is a written agreement specifying (1) the purpose
and legal authority for conducting the program and (2) a description of the records that
will be matched, including each data element that will be used. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(A),
(C) (1988). However, it also requires a cost-benefit analysis to insure that the benefits
outweigh the privacy costs of such a match. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(B) (1988). What this
Note has argued is that, if the computer match is narrowly drawn to serve one of the two
given purposes, then no invasion of privacy will occur, thus rendering the need for such a
balancing test moot.
54. H.R. REP. No. 802, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988) (stating that matching can identify people in one program who are also involved in a second program and who have a
specific characteristic).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1)(I) (1988).
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benefits, but the computer match still records him as a hit, has X's privacy been invaded? The answer is that the computer matching program, itself, does not create an invasion of privacy. X has placed
himself in a position where evaluation of information provided is expected. Consent has been given. As long as there is no breach of the
nonfeasant image, no new information has been disclosed and no invasion of privacy has occurred.
One response to this argument is that while X consented to evaluation of the information provided, X did not consent to the loss of privacy that comes from the attention now paid to X. Since X gave
truthful information, X did not expect to be caught in a computer
matching program used to verify his information.
Any attention a person receives after a computer match comes not
from the results of the match but from further verification or formal
inquiry procedures regarding the results. 56 If our only concern is privacy, then the best thing to do to protect privacy would be to immediately discontinue X's benefits. No attention is paid to X, and there is
less of a chance that a breach of the nonfeasant image will occur because no further inquiry is made. This situation requires that X have
the responsibility of proving that the computer match made a mistake.
If the costs of such a responsibility prove to be too great, then X has a
disincentive to engage in certain human relations. In an ironic twist,
protecting privacy in this manner impedes promotion of human
relations.
Post-match verification procedures are used to recognize a person's
due process rights and are desired for that reason. They are part of the
evaluation of information and are therefore expected. While one must
strike a balance between due process and privacy rights in determining
the level of post-match verification procedures, such a topic is beyond
the scope of this Note. Due process procedures can create an invasion
of privacy, but a computer matching program itself does not.
3. Promote Autonomy
The promotion of liberty, in promoting human relations, involves a
distinction between the liberty to make a truthful image, and the liberty to make any image. This Note suggests that privacy does not protect one's liberty to present a false or malfeasant image for reasons that
promote human relations. Autonomy, however, may be a value that
calls for privacy to protect any and all images, including malfeasant
ones. Professor Gavison has stated:
Autonomy is another value that is linked to the function of privacy in
promoting liberty. Moral autonomy is the reflective and critical accept56. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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ance of social norms, with obedience based on an independent moral
evaluation of their worth. Autonomy requires the capacity to make an
independent moral judgment, the willingness to exercise it, and the
courage to act on the results of this exercise even when the judgment is
not a popular one....
...No

matter how open a society may be, there is a danger that behav-

ior that deviates from norms will result in harsh sanctions. The prospect of this hostile reaction has an inhibitive effect. Privacy is needed
5 7
to enable the individual to deliberate and establish his opinions.
This argument seems to suggest that a person should be allowed to
present a malfeasant image protected by a privacy right so that the individual's true opinions will not be subject to harsh sanctions. Privacy
permits an individual to express his judgments to a group of likeminded people. After a period of germination, such individuals may be
more willing to declare their unpopular views in public.ms This way, the
individual is better able to achieve moral autonomy.
There is a problem with Professor Gavison's argument once it is applied to protection of the malfeasant image. As defined, "[a]utonomy
requires the capacity to make an independent moral judgment, the willingness to exercise it, and the courage to act on the results of this exercise even when the judgment is not a popular one."'5 9 The individual
who presents a malfeasant image has, necessarily, exercised his autonomy. He has made an independent moral judgment that it is acceptable
for him to lie in order for him to receive benefits. This Note believes
such a judgment to have been made independently because society, as a
whole, does not consider lying as acceptable behavior. The individual
has the willingness to exercise autonomy and the courage to act on the
results of this exercise even when the judgment is not a popular one.
The courage element, however, seems to be circumvented by a notion
that even a malfeasant image should be protected by a privacy right.
Courage implies that there is a certain risk involved in making an
unpopular judgment. This risk comes from an evaluation of the truth
of the judgment or opinion. By recognizing the risk, a person finds it
necessary to be able to defend his opinion. In order to defend his opinion, he must scrutinize it carefully and know exactly why he holds such
an opinion. After conducting such an analysis, a person is more likely
to be "self-respecting, self-possessed, and venturesome" ' ° (i.e.
autonomous).
If, however, a malfeasant image is not subject to evaluation, then
57.
58.
59.
60.

Gavison, supra note 12, at 449-50.
Id at 450.
Ik at 449.
Huff, supra note 43, at 783.
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the risk factor is gone. There is no need to scrutinize one's opinion
carefully, and one cannot be truly autonomous.
Certainly, the weaker our image of ourselves, both as vulnerable to
gossip and as morally weak, the more distorted becomes our fear of being found out and the more strongly we desire to control our image. A
person who is self-respecting, self-possessed, and venturesome is doubt61
less less afraid of what might be found out about him or her.
Protection of the malfeasant image from evaluation does not, therefore,
help a person become more autonomous. It may actually impede such
development.
As, however, Professor Gavison has stated,
No matter how open a society may be ... there is a danger that behavior that deviates from norms will result in harsh sanctions . . . [therefore] [p]rivacy is needed to enable the individual to deliberate and
establish his opinions. If public reaction seems likely to be unfavorable, privacy may permit an individual to express his judgments to a
group of like-minded people. After a period of germination, such individuals may be more willing to declare their unpopular views in
62
public.
The problem with this idea is the hypothesis that people with weak
images of themselves, the ones who desire protection of the malfeasant
image, will get together with other weak individuals and that this gathering will lead to an ability to accept the risk factor. The question is:
Why would a weak individual ever leave the sanctuary of privacy and
expose himself to the evaluation of others? While Professor Gavison
proposes a period of germination, one can also see a period of stagnation
as being more probable. Professor Gavison's idea is that these weak
people will become strong people and will accept the risk of announcing
their opinion. 63 The risk factor provides the necessary incentive to becoming autonomous. If a weak person never has to submit his or her
image for evaluation, then there would be no incentive to bolster confidence in one's image.
Another facet of the issue is the relationship between the idea that
privacy helps create moral autonomy and the idea that privacy enhances an individual's dignity. The idea that privacy is sometimes
needed to enhance moral autonomy by protecting an individual's malfeasant image seems fairly paternalistic. The fact that privacy is used to
protect an individual means that the individual is unable to protect him
or her self. This appears to be an assault on the person's dignity as a
human being. Yet, privacy is also used to protect a person's dignity.
These two goals of privacy seem to be at odds. How can privacy both
61. Id.
62. Gavison, supra note 12, at 450.
63. I&
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promote an individual's dignity and yet be so paternalistic? The way to
reconcile this problem is by returning to the idea "that our concern
should not be with the opinions men have of us but rather with the
64
truth of those opinions."
4. Promote Human Dignity
Stanley Benn has suggested "that a general principle of privacy
might be grounded on the more general principle of respect for persons .... To respect someone as a person is to concede that one ought to
take account of the way in which his enterprise might be affected by
one's own decisions." 65 Benn concluded:
A [person] will have grounds for resentment if the examiner appears
insensible to the fact that it is a person he is examining, a subject to
whom it makes a difference that he is observed, who will also have a
view about what is discovered or demonstrated, and will put his own
value on it.66

This close connection between the general principle of privacy and respect for persons creates the dangers of computerized data banks. It is
the "resentment that anyone-even a thoroughly trustworthy officialshould be able at will to satisfy any curiosity, without the knowledge let
'67
alone the consent of the subject.
A computer matching program used to verify an image that has
been presented (i.e. detect the malfeasant image) may impose an invasion of privacy because it infringes upon a person's dignity by treating
him or her as an object, rather than a subject. This Note argues that it
does not infringe upon a person's dignity. Conversely, to allow privacy
to protect the malfeasant image infringes upon a person's dignity by
treating him or her as an object rather than as a subject. Huff has
agreed that our privacy is invaded when "we are treated as the potential
objects of other's gratuitous evaluations rather than as persons." 68 Huff
has, however, stated that "our privacy is not invaded by the disclosure
of information because we choose to place ourselves in a position where
evaluations are expected." 69 Stanley Benn also stated that it is not "the
fact of scrutiny as such that is offensive, but only unlicensed
64. Huff, supra note 43, at 783.
65. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,in NOMOS XIII, PRIVACY 1, 8-9
(R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971) (Yearbook of the American Society for Political
and Legal Philosophy).
66. Id at 8.
67. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
68. Huff, supra note 43, at 782; see also Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,6
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26 (1976).

69. Huff, supra note 43, at 782. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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70

"Finding oneself an object of scrutiny... brings one to a new consciousness of oneself, as something seen through another's eyes."' 71 According to Jean-Paul Sartre, "[i]t is only through the regard of the other
that the observed becomes aware of himself as an object, knowable,
having a determinate character .... His consciousness of pure freedom
as subject, as originator and chooser,. . . is at once assailed by it ....-72
Sartre describes the human relation as "an obsessional need" to conquer
that observer's freedom which is undermining one's belief in one's own
freedom. 73 Benn explains the struggle:
Ego [the Observed's regard of oneself] is aware of Alter [observed as
seen through the eyes of the observer] not only as a fact, an object in
his world, but also as the subject of a quite independent world of Alter's own, wherein Ego himself is mere object. The relationship between the two is essentially hostile. Each, doubting his own freedom, is
driven to assert the primacy of his own subjectivity [as originator and
chooser]. But the struggle for mastery, as Sartre readily admits, is a
self-frustrating response; Alter's reassurance would be worthless unless
to Ego 7it4 was freely given, yet the freedom to give it would at once refute it.
Benn's response is that Sartre does not show why the awareness of
others as subjects must evoke a hostile response. The observed, recognizing Sartre's dilemma, can infer from it that the observer also sees
the observed as a subject and has the same problem. 75 This recognition
can create a bond between the observer and the observed rather than a
source of resentment when each accords the other the same dignity as a
subject. 76 The Huff-type consent is the manifestation of this bond.
When the observed initially presents an image to the observer, the observed is still recognized as a subject because he or she is the originator
and designer of the image presented. While recognizing that such an
act may be an attack upon the observer as subject, the Huff-type consent allows evaluation of the observed's image by the observer. In this
respect, the observer is regarded as a subject (an evaluator of the observed's image) and not an object. This way, both can achieve a new
consciousness of themselves without resorting to Sartre's hostile dilemma. The computer matching program, which serves to evaluate the
image presented, is an effective tool in enhancing Benn's bond, thus enhancing the dignity of both observer and observed.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Benn,supra note 66, at 8.
1d. at 7.
Id.; see JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, Le pour-autrui,in L'ETRE ET LE NEANT Part 3 (1953).
Benn,supra note 72, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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Consider, however, the consequences of protecting the malfeasant
image from evaluation. The rationale for doing so would be that such
evaluation creates resentment by treating the observed as an object.
This implies that Sartre is correct regarding his hostile dilemma. Stanley Benn has pointed out that,
[w]hat Sartre conceived as a phenomenologically necessary dilemma,
however, reappears in R.D. Laing's The Divided Self as a characteristically schizoid perception of the world, the response of a personality denied free development, trying to preserve itself from domination by
hiding away a "real self" where it cannot be absorbed or overwhelmed.
The [schizophrenic person's] problem arises because he or she cannot
believe fully in his or her own existence as a person....
It is because the schizophrenic person cannot believe in himself as a
form [Benn's] "bond," or accept the respectful
person, that he cannot
77
regard of another.
Therefore, protecting the malfeasant image implies that people need to
preserve themselves from domination by being able to hide away a real
self which cannot be evaluated. Allowing evaluation of the malfeasant
image causes resentment. Protecting the malfeasant image, then, relegates all people to a state of schizophrenia. Since any evaluation causes
resentment, they are necessarily unable to form Benn's bond. As Benn
has stated, "such persons do not believe in themselves as persons."
Such a definition of privacy severely infringes upon human dignity, a
function which privacy is supposed to promote.
...

V. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that computer matching programs do not create an invasion of privacy when their purpose is to evaluate an image
that a person has voluntarily presented. Efforts to regulate computer
matching programs should be minimal, in light of the ways that computer matching programs promote the functions of privacy. Regulations
need only ensure that the purpose of the match is evaluation or verification (detection of the malfeasant image) and that the results will not
be used for any other purpose.
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